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Abstract 
This paper explores the idea of regime switching as a new methodological approach to 
bring new insights into the natural resource curse hypothesis in the case of oil 
exporting countries. The basic idea is that when a threshold of oil dependence is 
passed, the relationship between economic growth and its determinants could move 
smoothly from a regime to another. Relying upon the estimation of a PSTR model, our 
findings offer strong evidence that oil revenues non-linearly impacts economic growth 
and that resource curse only exists under the condition of high oil dependence. More 
precisely, below the level of 51% of oil dependence, oil revenues have a positive 
impact on economic growth, whereas above this level, it have serious drawbacks on 
economic growth through inefficiencies into the quality and the quantity of 
government expenditures.  
 
J.E.L.: O11, Q32, Q38, Q43 
 
Key words: Natural resource curse, Panel Smooth Transition Regression, Oil 
exporting countries,  
                                                          
*
 BETA-CNRS, University of Lorraine, France. Email: Olivier.Damette@univ-nancy2.fr 
†
 Erudite, University of Paris Est-Créteil, France. Email: majda.seghir@etu.u-pec.fr 
 
 
2 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Natural resources give a nation a comparative advantage over others which 
leads to a better economic growth, all other things being equal. This assertion of 
Ricardian inspiration is far from being true: between the 1960’s and the 1990’s, the 
gap between economic growth in rich and poor countries in natural resources had 
grown in favor of the poor ones. In fact, energy commodities, such as oil, gas or coal 
exhibit some particular features which combination impedes economic growth and 
produces what has been called the “resource curse” (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Auty, 
2001; Polterovich and Popov, 2010). Those features include the unique role of energy 
commodities as a driver for global industrialization; the reserve depletion; the high 
price sensibility to variation of supply and demand, the ownership of oil and gas 
reserves by governments. 
Despite historical evidence, the causes of the resource curse are still a matter of 
debate and the negative correlation between economic growth and the availability of 
natural resources is far from being well-assessed.  In fact, in the empirical literature as 
well as in the theoretical literature (see Frankel (2010) for an exhaustive literature 
review), this curse appears to be the result of some specific mechanisms, of a 
particular combination of the factors identified below and even, of a particular context. 
Nonetheless, some findings support that the natural resource abundance could be a 
blessing. Alexeev and Conrad (2009) demonstrate that oil and mineral resources have 
enhanced rather than inhibited long-term growth.  Cavalcanti, Mohaddes and Raissi 
(2011) broadly corroborate this finding, supporting the more intuitive idea that oil has 
a positive effect on both income levels and economic growth.  
In this paper, we focus on oil exporting countries. First, we argue that the 
resource curse is more often a result of the level of oil dependence rather than a 
consequence of the mere existence of the natural resource. Second, we investigate the 
role of oil as limiting factor of production. Indeed, oil can enter the economic circuit 
as a source of revenues as well as an energy commodity used in the production 
process. The first function of oil is the most frequently investigated in the literature. 
Studies in the literature of natural resource curse, consider oil and by extension all 
energy commodities as a source of revenues which has a negative impact on economic 
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growth through different mechanisms. On the other side, natural resources and more 
precisely energy commodities play a key role as a factor of production. Hence, all the 
possible contribution of oil to the economy will be addressed. This paper explores the 
contribution of oil as a source of income and as well as an input. 
The previous studies on natural resource curse use standard linear models with 
interacting terms (between a proxy of natural resource abundance and a variable of 
institutional quality) and might not properly address nonlinear effects. There are two 
major drawbacks with this kind of specification. First, it assumes the same effect of 
natural resources on economic growth across the countries. However, this assumption 
is far from being true. Even, when considering a homogenous panel of oil exporting 
countries, the natural endowment of each country as well as production capacities are 
different and, by extension, the amount of oil revenues and by extension the effect of 
oil rent on economic growth should be different. Secondly, the standard approach 
assumes that the natural resource effect identified is constant over time. This postulate 
is unrealistic mostly in the case of oil exporting countries where the oil market and by 
extension the oil rent are subject to large time fluctuations induced by uncertainty over 
supply and demand. Therefore, the methodology used in most of the studies dealing 
with natural resource curse is a less effective approach.  
The alternative solution proposed in this paper consists in using a Panel 
Smooth Threshold Regression (PSTR hereafter) methodology, recently developed by 
Gonzalez et al. (2005) and Fok et al. (2004) following the work of Granger and 
Teräsvirta (1993) in a time series context. This model can be thought as a linear model 
with coefficients that vary across countries and over time. Heterogeneity in the 
regression coefficients is authorized by assuming that these coefficients are continuous 
functions of an observable variable through a bounded function of this variable called 
the transition function. The model could also be interpreted as a nonlinear 
homogeneous panel model. The transition variable plays a key role in influencing the 
effects of explanatory variables on the dependent variable. Thus, it is different from 
random coefficients models (Hsiao and Pesaran, 2004). In addition, this smooth model 
is less restrictive than the PTR developed by Hansen (1999) as stressed by Hudson and 
Minea (2013). 
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In the context of oil resource curse hypothesis, the oil dependence measure is 
the proper transition variable, as the impact of the explanatory variables on the 
economic growth vary with the transition variables at different regimes. Indeed, the 
higher are the revenues from oil, the higher is the risk of degradation in the 
institutional quality, in the allocation of government budget and by extension the bad 
is overall economic performance. In order to document these effects, we split the 
economic growth determinants into two categories. The first one is represented by the 
oil independent variables such private investment and total labor force. The second 
category contains the variables identified as sensitive to oil revenues, namely the 
institutional quality, the government expenditure, the degree of openness to 
international trade and the domestic consumption of fossil fuel.  
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we use a nonlinear PSTR 
specification to investigate the natural resource curse hypothesis as PSTR models can 
capture both cross country heterogeneity and time-variability of the relationship 
between oil dependence and economic growth determinants. Second, using the proxy 
of oil dependence (i.e. oil rent and oil exports as a percentage of GDP) as the transition 
variable in PSTR models can prove that beyond an endogenously determined 
threshold, the proxy has a negative impact on economic growth determinants. Third, 
we introduce the fossil fuel consumption as a determinant of economic growth under 
the assumption of its positive contribution as an abundant production factor. Thus the 
estimation results reconcile the conflicting views in the literature, supporting both the 
views of a resource curse and of a blessing.  
The paper begins with a brief review of the literature on natural resource curse. 
Then, section 3 presents the PSTR methodology. The next section introduces the data 
set and explained the threshold variables used in our model. The estimation results are 
presented and discussed in section 5. Finally, section 6 provides some concluding 
comments on the key points of this paper.  
2. Natural resource from blessing to curse: 
The first explanations for the resource curse, known as the “Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis”, assert that the share of raw material in GDP decreases faster than the 
share of manufacturing products because of the combined effect of a relatively slow 
rate of technical progress in the primary sector and an adverse trend in the commodity 
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terms of trade. A come back to protectionism for developing countries is then 
recommended as their industries are not competitive (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950). 
However, Cuddington, Ludema and Jayasuriya (2001) find that the relative 
commodity prices follow a random walk across the 20
th
 century and consequently 
there is no evidence of a significant negative trend in real commodity prices. 
Matsuyama (1992) argues that specialization in primary commodities can be 
detrimental to growth if it crowds out the manufacturing sector and the latter is the 
locus of positive externalities. This de-industrialization issue is also the core of the 
Dutch disease analysis even if the mechanisms are different. The Dutch disease theory 
is based on a positive demand shock of raw material which leads to labor and 
resources reallocation towards the non-tradable sector to the detriment of other 
tradable sectors (Corden and Neary, 1982; Krugman, 1987; Neary and Van 
Wijnbergen, 1986). The excess demand in the non-tradable sector implies a change in 
the relative prices and thus an appreciation of the exchange rate detrimental to the non-
resources tradable sector. Dutch disease appears to be a market failure that impedes 
the economy industrialization and by extension economic growth. However, there is 
no empirical evidence for the Dutch disease diagnosis in natural resource rich 
countries (Davis, 1995; Oomes and Kalcheva, 2007).  
In a different vein, the second stand of the natural resource curse literature 
focuses on institutional explanations, either if the weakness of political institution is 
pre-resource boom or if it occurs after the boom. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 
(2003) were among the first to look for a political link as an explanation of the 
connection between resource abundance and poor economic growth. Adopting the 
Sachs-Warner cross-sectional empirical strategy, they found that, while resource 
abundance is linked to slow economic growth, the entire effect operates through an 
institutional channel, represented by a rule of law index. If the institutional effect is 
controlled for, resource abundance has no further direct effect on economic growth. 
Overall, we can summarize the institutional effect by variants of Rent-seeking 
behavior in natural resource countries. Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane 
(1999) highlight a voracious effect through which governments transfer wealth from 
private sector to powerful interests, possibly by taxation, theft, bribe channels, forced 
participation, nationalization or expropriation. Torvik (2002) and Mehlun et al. (2006) 
stress the negative effect on growth of the switching behavior of individuals from 
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increasing returns to scale industries to non-productive rent-seeking. The institutional 
arguments cover also the significant effect of natural resource to erode country’s 
political institution and to conduct to conflicts, especially when the degree of 
fractionalization is high (Hodler, 2006; Popov and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Bjorvatn et al, 
2012).  
Concurrently to these arguments, the historical experience of some countries 
combined to empirical studies exhibit a positive link between natural resources and 
economic growth. The development of manufacturing in the U.S. in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 
centuries, as well as the recent development of industry in Australia and Norway, 
could be widely related to their energy commodity wealth (Wright and Czelustra, 
2004). Moreover, Pomerantz (2001) and Allen (2009) place energy commodity centre-
stage in their explanations of why the industrial revolution occurred in Britain.  Davies 
(1995) challenged the conclusions of the resource curse by investigating the 
performance of mineral and non-mineral in relation to GNP per capita and social 
indicators. He finds no evidence that commodity rich countries performed less well. 
Lederman and Maloney (2007), Manzanon and Rigobon(2007) as well as Bravo-
Ortega and De Gregorio (2007) support this result.  
The overall picture that emerges is that both the curse and the blessing theories 
are possible, depending of the natural resource level dependence of the economy. This 
paper contributes to this debate by testing the level of dependence of the economy on 
energy commodity. We assume that the energy commodities play a double role in the 
economic growth: first as an abundant production factor and second as a revenue 
source.  
3. Methodology 
In this section, we present the panel smooth transition regression model as well 
as the tests preceding the parameter estimation. First, we describe the model and its 
properties. Second, we introduce the set of necessary tests before parameter 
estimation. 
a. Model specification 
As notice before, the main question is here to resolve the heterogeneity and time 
variability issues associated with the empirical literature on the resource curse. As 
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mentioned in the introduction, the PSTR specification has the main advantage to allow 
parameters to vary across countries and over time. Following Gonzales et al. (2005), in 
the case of two regimes and a single transition function, the model can be written as 
follows:   
                                      ; i=1,...,N, and t=1,...,T. (1)  
 
N and T denote the cross section and time dimensions of the panel, respectively and     
is independently and identically distributed error term for all i and t.     is the 
dependent variable of economic growth,    is a vector of individual fixed effects,     is 
the vector of time-varying explanatory variables (regime dependent variables) and     
is the vector of time-invariant regressors (regime independent variables). The 
transition function            is a continuous function of the observable transition 
variable     and is normalized to be bounded between 0 and 1. These extreme values 
are associated with regression coefficients    and       which represent the 
coefficients associated with the explanatory variables in the linear and in the nonlinear 
regimes respectively.   is the transition or slope parameter, describing the slope of the 
transition function.   is the location parameter.  
Theoretically, a smooth transition mechanism can be modeled using various 
transition functions as long as they are continuous and integrable on [0,1]. We follow 
Gonzales et al. (2005) and retain the logistic specification as follows: 
                         
 
         
  
with      and       
    . 
(2)  
 
Where    determines the smoothness of the transitions and   = (        is an m-
dimensional vector of location parameters. Gonzales et al. (2005) indicate that it is 
usually sufficient to consider the cases of m=1 or m=2. These values generally permit 
the necessary changes in the slope coefficient to account for a majority of non-
linearity due to regime changes. For m=1, the model means that the two extreme 
regimes are associated with low and high values of     and the change is centred 
around   . When    , the transition function becomes an indicator function and the 
PSTR reduces to the panel threshold regression (PTR) model of Hansen (1999). In 
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contrast when    , the transition function becomes constant and the model collapses 
into a homogeneous or linear panel regression model with fixed effects. In the case of 
m=2, the transition function has its minimum at           and attains the value of 1 
both at the low and high values of the transition variable. Therefore, the model 
becomes a three-regime model whose outer regimes are identical and different from 
the middle regime.  
 In line with Gonzales et al. (2005), the testing strategy is a step by step 
procedure. First, we test for linearity: if the null hypothesis is not rejected then the 
testing strategy has to be stopped and a different transition variable has to be tested. 
On the contrary, if the null hypothesis of linearity is rejected, the second step consists 
in testing the non-remaining linearity i.e. testing the number of regimes. Finally, we 
proceed to the estimation of parameters.  
b. Linearity test and parameter estimation 
Gonzales et al. (2005) outlined a procedure for testing linearity against PSTR 
model in line with Luukonen, Saikkonen and Terarsvirta (1988). 
 Indeed, testing      is non standard because the PSTR model is not 
identified under the null hypothesis (c and   are unidentified nuisance parameter). In 
the same way,  testing     
                                   
             
 
(3)  
 
where the parameter vectors           are multiples of   and                  
with    is the remainder of the Taylor expansion. Therefore, testing        is 
equivalent to testing                . Two usual tests for this null hypothesis 
are identified in the related literature: the Lagrange Multiplier-based test (LM) and its 
Fisher version (   ): 
   
             
    
  and     
           
  
    
           
 
(4)  
where      is the panel sum of squared residuals under   (the linear panel with fixed 
effects),      is the panel sum of squared residuals under the PSTR hypothesis and k 
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is the number of explanatory variables. Under   , the LM statistic is asymptotically 
distributed as       while the F-version has an F (mk,TN-N-m(k+1)) distribution.  
If the null hypothesis of linearity is rejected, the next step is to test the number 
of transitions function in the model or equivalently the number of extreme regimes. 
Basically, this test aims at testing whether the total model heterogeneity is captured by 
the first transition function or whether there is a need for a second transition function. 
In other words we test the null hypothesis of two regimes (r=1) against the alternative 
hypothesis of three regimes (r=2). The underlying model becomes: 
                        
   
                  
   
                 
(5)  
 
 
As before, the transition function is replaced by a Taylor expansion around     . 
Therefore the resulting test collapses into the linearity test discussed before.  
Next, we proceed to the parameter estimation of the PSTR model in two steps: 
first, we remove the individual fixed effects. Second, since the smoothness parameter 
  and the location parameter c are endogenously determined, we use a grid search to 
choose the starting values of these parameters. Then, we estimate the other parameters 
by Non-linear Least Squares (NLS). Note that with normally distributed errors, this 
procedure is equivalent to the maximization of a concentrated log-likelihood as 
suggested by Gonzalez et al. (2005).  
4. Economic growth determinants and oil dependence  
a. Variables discussion 
In the present discussion, we focus on the effect of oil dependence on 
economic growth determinants and by extension on economic growth. Following 
Boschini et al (2012), we keep two measures of oil dependence, namely oil rent and 
oil exports, both expressed in proportion of GDP.  While most of previous studies 
exploring the resource curse used a country’s dependence on oil exports –that is, the 
value of its petroleum exports as a fraction of its gross domestic product-, in this paper 
we count for the oil sold domestically by using oil rent as proxy for oil dependence. 
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Each of these measures will be involved as transition variables in a separate model to 
determinate the threshold effect of oil dependence on economic growth. 
We split the set of economic growth determinants into two categories. The first 
one consists in the regime independent variables, namely initial level of GDP (to 
control for conditional convergence), investment as a ratio of real GDP, age 
dependency (to control for the structure of population). These variables should not be 
affected by the level of oil revenues and consequently by the transition variable. The 
second one consists in variables which are likely to be sensitive to oil revenues i.e. 
regime dependent variables: the ratio of government consumption to GDP, the extent 
of international openness, the domestic consumption of fossil fuel and institutional 
quality.  
Indeed, in most of oil exporting countries, the governments spend a large part 
of the oil rent on financing infrastructure and production projects as well as on direct 
public transfers and subsidization. Thus these expenses are directly affected by the 
amount of oil revenues. The international openness measured by the sum of exports 
and imports as a proportion of GDP, is more likely to arise as the proportion of oil 
exports grows. We also add fossil fuel consumption as a regime dependent variable. 
Indeed, despite the positive contribution of natural capital to economic growth, the 
context of growing foreign demand of oil may reduce the fossil fuel consumption. 
Finally we include variables related to institutional quality. Considering the 
institutional quality, previous studies on natural resource curse use indicators that 
capture the rules of law (Rodrick, Subramanian, and Trebbi; 2002), measures of an 
expropriation risk for investors (Acemoglu, Johanson, and Robinson; 2001) or 
indicators of transparency (Williams, 2011). Some other studies focus on the political 
structure – for instance, Bjorvatn, Farzanegan and Schneider (2012) use the political 
fractionalization in understanding the resource curse. In fact, and according to the 
“rent cycling theory” enunciated by Auty (1990, 2001, 2007, 2009), high-rent 
countries elicits a political contest to capture ownership whereas in low-rent countries, 
the government motivates people to create wealth by promoting quality, and fostering 
civil society. Therefore, the two main questions for economic growth in most of oil 
exporting countries is “what do governments do with this rent?” and “how does the 
quality of government decisions evolve with oil rent?” For these reasons, and to shed 
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light on the underlying connections between quality of political decisions and 
pertinence of economic strategies, we choose to use an indicator of “government 
effectiveness”. This aggregate index reflects the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation as well as the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies and the degree of independence from political pressures. Finally we include 
this index among the regime dependent variables to test for to variation of government 
quality with the level of oil dependence. 
b. The models estimated 
We define three models to test the hypothesis of natural resource curse. In the 
first model (called model A), we assume that the transition mechanism in the 
economic growth equation is determined by oil rent. We are expecting that the 
stronger is the oil dependence, the higher is the negative effect of oil rent on the 
economic growth determinants. In the second specification (model B), we control for 
our results by using the ratio of oil exports instead of the oil rent as a proxy for oil 
dependence. Finally, we test for a third specification (model C) where the transition 
variable is the ratio of oil exports and we include the fossil fuel consumption among 
the regime dependent variables. The rationale behind the latter specification is to 
investigate the direct contribution of oil endowment as a production factor rather than 
a mere source of revenue as well as the variation of fossil fuel consumption with the 
oil exports.  The PSTR model can be written as follows: 
         
       
          
           
                
       
        
  
           
                                     ;  i=1,...,N, and t=1,...,T. 
(6)  
and 
                               
 
   
      
  
 
(7)  
 
Where    denotes the economic growth per capita.        is the openness ratio, 
        is the ratio of government expenditure and             represents the 
government effectiveness. The set of regime independent variables is represented by 
   , namely; the initial level of GDP, investment and age dependency.   
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The lagged transition variable         represents i) the oil rent in model A, ii) the ratio 
of oil exports to GDP in  model B and C. As mentioned by Fouquau, Hurlin and 
Rabaud (2008), the transition variable may have a direct effect on the dependent 
variable (the economic growth in this paper). In this case, one could misleadingly find 
switching. To avoid this shortcoming, we replace the current transition variable with a 
lagged transition variable to proceed to the estimation of the PSTR.  
5. Data and empirical results:  
a. Dataset and descriptive statistics   
The panel dataset includes 23 oil exporting countries and covers the period 
1996-2011. The variables used in this paper stem from the World Bank Indicator, 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) and United Nations Database. The data 
description and sources are presented in Appendix A. Appendix B reports descriptive 
statistics of all the variables used. Note that we also compute standard panel unit root 
tests to avoid spurious regressions problems. All the variables are stationary
3
 and the 
PSTR model is thus well pecified.  
b. Linearity tests: 
The first step consists in testing the linearity existence. Table 1 depicts the 
results of linearity test. The two statistics lead to strongly reject the null hypothesis of 
linearity in the effect of oil dependence on economic growth determinants for each of 
our three models. The table presents also the test for no remaining non-linearity after 
assuming a two-regime model (r=1). The results show that the null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected, implying that the model exhibits only two regimes. Therefore, the 
coefficients fluctuate between a low regime and a high regime delimited by the 
threshold (c) and the slope parameter. 
Table 1. Linearity and no-remaining linearity tests 
Model Model A 
 
Threshold variable 
 
Oil rent (%GDP) 
  
   
 
    
                 21.369 (0.00) 5.261 (0.00) 
                                                          
3
 The results are available upon request 
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                 4.108   (0.53) 0.739 (0.59) 
Model Model B 
 
Threshold variable 
 
Oil exports (%GDP) 
  
   
 
    
                 41.473(0.00) 3.522(0.00) 
                 3.925(0.56) 0.705 (0.62) 
Model Model  C 
 
Threshold variable 
 
Oil exports (%GDP) 
  
   
 
    
                 23.487(0.00) 4.643(0.00) 
                   
                    Note: The p-values are reported in parentheses 
 
c. Parameter estimation: 
Table 2.  PSTR model estimation 
Model Model A Model B Model C 
 
Threshold variable 
 
Oil rent 
 
Ratio 
expo 
 
Ratio 
expo 
Initial level of GDP -0.050*** -0.046*** -0,055*** 
Invest. 0.111** 0.124** 0.108** 
Labor 
 
0.089 *** 0.070*** 0.046 * 
Oil rent  0.330***   
Oil exports  0.270*** 0.349*** 
Gov. effectiveness   0.052*** 0.096*** 0.144*** 
Fossil fuel consumption   0.014** 
Openness ratio -0.061*** -0.034 -0.042 
Govex 
 
0.114 0.001 -0.143** 
Oil rent*               -0.096***   
Oil exports*                -0,076*** -0.077* 
Gov.effectiveness*               -0.045** -0.156*** -0.117*** 
Fossilfuel 
consumption*               
  0.001 
Openness ratio *               0.247*** 0.016 0.027 
Govex *               
 
-0.680** -0.186*** -0.154 
  16.81 5.00 3.89 
C 51% 44% 28% 
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth of real GDP per capita.   and c respectively denote the estimated slope 
parameter and the estimated location parameter in equation    (7).                 
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            ***: significance at 1% level 
            **: significant at 5% level 
            *: significant at 1% level                                                                                            
 
Table 2 reports the parameter estimates of the PSTR specification of the 
determinants of growth in oil exporting. Considering the set of control variables, the 
results from the three PSTR specifications lead to similar results. The estimated 
coefficient of initial GDP confirms the conditional convergence hypothesis that has 
been reported in various studies (Barro,1991; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992). Thus 
the initial economic position is determinant for economic growth. The ratio of 
domestic investment to GDP and the total labor force have positives and statistically 
significant coefficient and are consistent with findings in the literature. 
The first PSTR specification (Model A) uses oil rent as transition variable 
which defines the low and the high regimes of oil dependence. Below the threshold of 
51% of oil dependence, the government effectiveness indicator and oil rent increase 
economic growth by 5.2 % and 33% respectively. However, in the high regime of oil 
dependence, this positive effect wears off and even turns negative. Above the level of 
51% of oil dependence, there is a clear evidence of resource curse through the 
significant negative effect of government effectiveness (decrease economic growth by 
4.5 %) and oil rent (decrease economic growth by 9.6 %). We also have to notice the 
positive interaction between openness and high oil dependence and the negative 
association between government expenditure and the high level of oil rent.  
In order to improve our results, we use another proxy for oil dependence as 
threshold variable, namely the ratio of oil exports to GDP (Model B). The results 
obtained from this second specification of the PSTR model are convergent with those 
from the model A. Finally, the model C highlights the positive contribution of fossil 
fuel to economic growth as long as the level of oil dependence does not exceed the 
threshold of 28%. Above this level, the effect is still positive but not significant.  
Overall, we can also notice the relatively low values of the smoothness parameters 
(especially in models B and C) and then the use of the PSTR modeling. 
d. Discussion:  
It comes from these results, that high oil dependence worsened the institutional 
quality and by extension the economic growth. In fact, we can distinguish between a 
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direct and an indirect effect of institutional quality. The first one is given directly by 
government effectiveness through the quality of public services and the ability to 
implement policy independently from political pressure. The second effect is a 
consequence of the government effectiveness through the quality of government 
expenditure. Looking at the results, the contribution of government expenditures 
smoothly switches from positive in the low oil dependence regime to negative in the 
high regime. Barro (2003) explains that a negative effect on economic growth because 
government expenditures do not affect productivity directly and entail distortion of 
private decisions. In the case of oil exporting countries, the oil rent is spent on large 
government bureaucracies as well as financing infrastructures and production projects. 
The latter part could, in principle, be a growth stimulant. However, that role is often 
undermined owing to the inefficiencies in investment and infrastructure. Gavin (1993) 
points out “the tendency for governments to invest in projects with high prestige or 
political payoff, but with little economic rationale” and  Esfahani (2006) noted that in 
oil-rich countries of MENA, a large part of oil revenues are transferred in the form of 
mass subsidies on energy, staple foods and credit. Thus the quality of government 
expenditure reflects the governmental activities and quality themselves.   
The literature offers several hypotheses to explain the linkages between bad 
government performances and natural dependence. For instance, Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006) model underdevelopment as the result of political elites blocking 
technological and institutional development because such development may erode the 
elite’s incumbency advantages. Such blocking is more likely to arise when the rents 
from maintaining power are high, such as where public income is derived from natural 
resources. To draw a parallel with our results, beyond the threshold of a 51% 
contribution of oil rent on GDP, there exists such an inefficiency of governments. 
Moreover, one special feature of the government effectiveness indicator is the 
government commitment to the policies. Levy and Spiller (1996) and Esfahani (2006) 
define commitment as the cost that policymakers must bear if they decide to reverse an 
adopted policy in ways that take away the returns to investments made in response to 
that policy. If the politicians can change policies with no cost to themselves, they may 
find it convenient to ignore the losses of the producers, and thus discourage 
entrepreneurs from investment in the first place. Acemoglu (2003) develops a simple 
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model where commitment problems lead to inefficient policies and institutions and by 
extension to lower outcomes.  
From the previous results, we also report a direct negative effect of oil 
revenues on economic growth when the level of oil dependence exceeds the threshold 
of 51% using oil rent and 44% using oil exports. The rationale behind these results lies 
in the high instability of oil revenues. The macroeconomic imbalances induced by the 
uncertainty of oil revenues are one of the arguments in favor of the resource curse. 
Indeed, the uncertainty of unanticipated output growth has a negative effect on growth 
and thus the positive effect of resources on growth is swamped by the indirect negative 
effect through volatility. Therefore, oil economies which are highly dependent in oil 
revenues are more likely exposed to drawbacks from oil volatility. Van der Ploeg and 
Poelhekke (2009) finds that natural resource exports typically have a positive direct 
effect on growth, but a larger, indirect, negative effect due to the economic volatility 
that they create. 
In the third PSTR specification (Model C), we use the ratio of oil exports as 
threshold variable and we introduce the domestic fossil fuel consumption as an 
economic growth determinant in addition to the previous regime dependent variable. 
The results from the model C, highlight the positive contribution of fossil fuel 
consumption to economic growth. However, this effect is extremely robust in the low 
regime but less in the high regime. Indeed, the oil endowment and the higher oil 
subsidization lead to low energy prices which is used as a tool to distribute state 
benefits to the population as well as to promote industrialization and economic 
diversification4. Therefore, the oil exporting countries are among the most-energy 
intensive economies in the world because of the rising domestic demand and the 
development of energy-intensive industries. Consequently, arising fossil fuel 
consumption arise economic growth and denotes a positive effect of natural resource 
on economic development.  
6. Conclusion 
                                                          
4
 According to IEA measures and report, oil exporting countries are among the largest subsidizers of energy in 
the world. “Joint report by IEA, OPEC, OECD and World Bank on fossil fuel and other energy subsidies: An 
update of the G20 Pittsburgh and Toronto Commitments, 2011” 
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This paper presents new insights into the analysis of the relationship between 
natural resource and economic development when considering a sample of oil 
exporting countries. The data covers 23 oil exporting countries for the period 1996-
2011. We follow earlier studies and use two measures of oil dependence: oil rent and 
oil exports as proportion of GDP. This paper’s most significant innovation is an 
improved econometric methodology that overcomes the constancy parameter -across 
countries and over time- of standard regression. We use a Panel Smooth Transition 
Regression model and highlight the existence of a threshold of oil dependence which 
determines two regimes. The threshold is around 51% of oil rent and 44% of oil 
exports. The low regime of oil dependence is below these thresholds whereas the high 
regime is located above. Considering the effect of oil incomes both on economic 
growth and on its determinants, the impact is positive in the low regime whereas it 
turns negative in the high regime. Therefore there is no resource curse as long as the 
fraction of oil rent is below the level of 51%. The countries, where this level is upper, 
present evidence of resource curse through three channels: i) the direct negative 
impact of oil incomes on economic growth due to the high instability of petroleum 
revenues which discourages in turn private sector investment ii) fluctuations in the 
government’s resources revenues undermine the quality of government’s expenditure 
iii) finally, high oil revenues impede the government effectiveness. Contrary to 
previous studies on resource curse, we also consider the role of oil as an input in the 
production function. From that perspective, the results show a positive contribution of 
fuel consumption to economic growth. Our evidence strongly suggests that oil is an 
engine to economic growth through domestic consumption and in the case of low oil 
dependence. Nonetheless in the case of high oil dependence, the oil revenues are 
mostly a hindrance to economic growth.  
 
 
Appendix A 
List of countries  
Algeria Kuwait 
Angola Malaysia 
Azerbaijan Mexico 
Bahrain Nigeria 
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Bolivia Oman 
Brazil Qatar 
Cameroon Russian Federation 
Ecuador Saudi Arabia 
Gabon United Arab Emirates 
Indonesia Venezuela 
Kazakhstan Yemen 
 
Appendix B 
Data description 
Variable Description and Source 
GDP Real GDP per capita (constant 2005USD). 
Source: United Nation Database  
Investment Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP). Source: 
United Nation Database 
Age dependency Logarithm of age dependency ratio (% of working age 
population). Source: World Bank Indicator. 
Oil rent Oil rents are the difference between the value of crude 
oil production at world prices and total costs of 
production (% of GDP). Source: World Bank Indicator. 
Oil exports The price per unit of oil exports multiplied by the 
number of quantity units (% of GDP). Source: World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) data, IMF. 
openness Sum of imports and exports (% of GDP). Source: United 
Nation Database 
Govex Government consumption (% of GDP). Source: United 
Nation Database 
Gove.effectiveness Government Effectiveness Index. Scale from -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong). Source: Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI). 
Fossil fuel 
consumption 
Logarithm of fossil fuel consumption per capita (Kg of 
oil equivalent per capita). Source: World Development 
Indicators. 
 
Appendix C 
Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Minim
um  
Maxi
mum 
Growth of GDP 
per capita 
0.024 0.052 -0.161 0.283 
Oil rent 0.247 0.222 0.003 2.095 
Invest. 0.221 0.081 0.055 0.552 
govex 0.143 0.067 0.011 0.647 
Openness ratio 0.842 0.413 0.205 2.209 
Labor 4.049 0.370 2.806 4.739 
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Oil exports 0.297 0.305 0.001 3.358 
Fossil fuel 
consumption 
3.481 4.583 0.058 23.071 
Gove.effectiven
ess 
-0.289 0.642 -1.462 1.240 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Allen, R. C. (2009). The British industrial revolution in global perspective. The Economic History 
Review, 63(1), 242-245. 
Alexeev, M., & Conrad, R. (2009). The elusive curse of oil. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
91(3), 586–598. 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001). The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation. American Economic Review, 91, 1369–401. 
Acemoglu, D. (2003). Why not a political Coase theorem?  Social conflict, commitment, and politics. 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4), 620–652. 
Acemoglu, D., and Robinson, J. A. (2006). Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective.  American 
Political Science Review, 100, 115–31. 
Auty, R. M. (1990).Resource-Based Industrialization: Sowing the Oil in Eight Developing  
  Countries .Clarendon Press: Oxford. 
Auty, R. M. (1997). Natural resource endowment, the state and development strategy. Journal of            
International Development, 9(4), 651–663. 
Auty, R. M. (2001). Resource Abundance and Economic Development. World Institute for  
Development Economics Research (Oxford University Press). 
Auty, R. M. (2007). Patterns of Rent-Extraction and Deployment in Developing Countries:  
Implications for Governance, Economic Policy and Performance.  G. Mavrotas and A.  
Shorrocks, editors, Advancing Development: Core Themes in Global Economics 
(Palgrave:  
London),555-577.  
20 
 
Auty, R. M. (2009). The Political Economy of Hydrocarbon Revenue Cycling in Trinidad and  
Tobago. World Bank. 
Barro, R. (1991). Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries. Quarterly Journal of  
Economics, 407–444. 
Barro, R. (2003). Determinants of Economic Growth in a Panel of Countries. Annals of Economics and 
Finance, 4(2), 231–274. 
Bjorvatn, K., Farzanegan, M.R., &Schneider ,F. (2012).Resource Curse and Power Balance: Evidence 
from Oil-Rich Countries. World Development, 40(7), 1308–1316. 
Boschini, A., Pettersson J. &Roine J. (2012). The resource Curse and its Potential Reversal. World 
Development, 43, 19–41. 
Bravo-Ortega, C., & De Gregorio, J. (2007). The Relative Richness of the Poor? Natural Resources, 
Human Capital, and Economic Growth. Lederman and Maloney, 71–103. 
Brunnschweiler, C. N., & Bulte, E. H. (2008). The resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of 
paradoxes and red herrings. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 55(3), 
248–264. 
Davis, G. A. (1995). Learning to love the Dutch Disease: Evidence from the mineral economies. World 
Development, 23(10), 1765-1779. 
Esfahani, H.S. (2006). A reexamination of the political economy of growth in the MENA countries. 
Contributions to Economic Analysis, 278, 61-102. 
Frankel, J.F. (2010). The natural resource curse: A survey. NBER working paper, no. 15836. 
Fok, D., van Dijk, D., & Franses, P. (2004). A multi-level panel STAR model for US manufacturing 
sectors. Working Paper, University of Rotterdam. 
Fouquau, J., Hurlin, C., & Rabaud, I. (2008). The Feldstein–Horioka puzzle: A panel smooth transition 
regression approach. Economic Modeling, 25, 284–299. 
Gavin, M. (1993). Adjusting to a Terms of Trade Shock: Nigeria 1972–88. R. Dornbusch (ed.), 
Policymaking in the Open Economy, Oxford, Basil Blackwell. 
21 
 
González, A., Teräsvirta, T., & Dijk, D. van. (2005). Panel smooth transition regression models. SSE/EFI 
Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance. Retrieved from 
http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/56363 
Hodler, R. (2006). The curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries. European Economic 
Review, 50(6), 1367–1386. 
Lane, P. R. & Tornell, A. (1996). Power, Growth, and the Voracity Effect. Journal of Economic Growth, 
1(2), 213-41. 
Lane, P. R. & Tornell, A. (1999). The Voracity Effect. American Economic Review, American Economic 
Association, 89(1), 22-46. 
Lederman, D., & Maloney, W. F. (2007). Trade structure and growth. In D. Lederman, & W. F. 
Maloney (Eds.), Natural resources, neither curse nor destiny. Washington: Stanford University 
Press and World Bank. 
Levy, B. & P. Spiller, (1996). Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment: Comparative Studies in 
Telecommunications. Cambridge University Press. 
Luukkonen, R., Saikkonen, P., & Teräsvirta, T. (1988). Testing linearity against smooth transition 
autoregressive models. Biometrika, 75(3), 491–499. 
Mankiw, G., Romer, D., Weil, D. (1992). A contribution to the empirics of economics growth. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107 (2), 407–437. 
Manzano, O., & Rigobon, R. (2001). Resource curse or debt overhang? National Bureau of Economic 
Research.  
Manzano, O., & Rigobon, R. (2007). Resource curse or debt overhang?. In D. Lederman, & W. F. 
Maloney (Eds.), Natural resources, neither curse nor destiny. Washington: Stanford University 
Press and World Bank. 
Matsuyama, K. (1992). Agricultural Productivity, Comparative Advantage, and Economic  
Growth. Journal of Economic Theory , 58, 317–334. 
22 
 
Mehlum, H., Moene, K., & Torvik, R. (2006). Institutions and resource curse. Economic Journal, 
116(508), 1–20. 
Oomes, N. &Kalcheva, K. (2007). Diagnosing Dutch Disease: Does Russia Have the Symptoms. 
International Monetary Fund Working Paper. 
Poelhekke, Steven & Frederick van der Ploeg (2007). Volatility, Financial Development and the  
Natural Resource Curse. CEPR DP6513, October. 
Prebisch, R. (1950). The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems 
(New York). 
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A., & Trebbi, F. (2002). Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over 
geography and integration in economic development. National Bureau of Economic 
Research.  
Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (1995). Natural resource abundance and economic growth. NBER 
Working Paper 5398. 
Sala-I-Martin, Xavier, & Subramanian  A. (2003). Addressing the Natural Resource Curse:  An 
Illustration from Nigeria. IMF Working Paper WP/03/139. 
Singer, H. W. (1950). US Foreign Investment in Underdeveloped Areas: The Distribution of  
Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries. American Economic Review,  
40, 473–85. 
Torvik, R. (2002). Natural resources, rent-seeking and welfare. Journal of Development Economics, 
67(2), 455–470. 
Wright, G., & Czelusta, J. (2004). The myth of the resource curse. Challenge, 47(2), 6–38. 
Wu,P.C., Liu, S.Y. ,& Pan, S.C. (2013). Nonlinear bilateral trade balance-fundamentals nexus: A panel 
smooth transition regression approach. International Review of Economics and Finance, 27, 
318–329. 
 
 
